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“Deeper into a Hole?”
Borrowing and Lending in South Africa
by Deborah James
In South Africa, with upward mobility much aspired to but seldom attained, householders must spend money they
have not yet earned. Borrowing both from formal institutions and smaller moneylenders (legal and illegal) positions
them uneasily: in order to fulfill social requirements in one register, they acquire intensified obligations in another.
Moneylending and money borrowing, owing much to the legacies of “credit apartheid,” involve an uneven mix.
Embeddedness and community connection enable flexibility, juggling, and temporary escape from repayment ob-
ligations on the one hand, but systems of repayment and ever-newer technologies enable creditors to pursue debtors
with inexorable swiftness on the other. Given that credit postapartheid has an increasingly formal, uniform, and
financialized character, the second of these—which makes debtors get “deeper into a hole”—is becoming a pre-
dominant way of experiencing and representing the situation. The phrase, with its suggestion of entrapment, captures
an important aspect of the deeply ambivalent feelings that borrowers experience in the face of debt.
The three elements of this special issue of Current Anthro-
pology—crisis, value, and hope—are inextricably combined
in the phenomenon that is the topic of this paper, that is,
debt. In South Africa, the moment of democracy coincided
with the extension of credit to many who were formerly un-
able to borrow. It held out the promise and expectation of
inclusion to people formerly denied it. As elsewhere in the
world but here beginning in a more precipitous manner, the
supply of and demand for credit interacted in a complex
relationship to facilitate the rapid growth of a new middle
class as well as promise the fulfilment of aspiration to a far
larger group of people (Servet and Saiag 2013). As prospective
consumers enthusiastically embraced the possibility of bor-
rowing in order to secure highly valued things, opportunities,
and relationships, credit also started being “sold”—as hap-
pened elsewhere (see Villarreal 2014)—to prospective takers
as necessary or inevitable, drawing yet further numbers into
the net. Such credit was being used not simply for materialist
consumerism but to satisfy the desire for what was felt nec-
essary for a good life. When the lure of credit turned into
unpayable debt, many of those initially offered hopes of ad-
vance—aspiring to possess those things formerly reserved for
people wealthier than themselves—were threatened with fur-
ther marginalization. Fearful of the unsustainable and crisis-
like character of the situation, policy makers and analysts,
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several years before the “subprime” debacle in the United
States, were devising a regulatory framework to tackle the
problem.
Exploring the circumstances that gave rise to their alarm,
this paper also gives attention to models used by local actors
to assess and evaluate their present and future circumstances.
Local ideas of worth may challenge the tendency to measure
all value by—and demand repayment in—its universal equiv-
alent, money (Hann and Hart 2011:49), and considering such
ideas ought to help us contest analyses that seek to represent
all economic matters by measuring them in purely contractual
terms. Considering debt in this way potentially directs the
emphasis away from uniform measures of value and toward
diverse ones. But in settings such as South Africa where fin-
ancialization is far advanced (Ardington et al. 2004; Barchiesi
2011; Daniels 2004; Porteous and Hazelhurst 2004; Schoom-
bee 2004, 2009),1 the imperative to repay may become less
easy to escape.
Debt gives a particularly poignant and edgy character to
hope. It also throws value into question by threatening im-
pending future crisis. If there has been a proliferation of the
things that are felt essential in order to actualize the kind of
life aspired to, then buying them “on tick” (promise to pay)
is often the only way forward. In doing so, the debtor can
“borrow speculative resources from his/her own future and
transform them into concrete resources to be used in the
present” (Peebles 2010:226). The way debt links these two
1. The South African economy rapidly liberalized in the late 1990s
and early 2000s and became extensively financialized. This, in the absence
of investment in manufacturing and production, has been seen as ac-
counting for South Africa’s “jobless growth” during that period (Marais
2011:124–128, 132–139).
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Figure 1. Map of South Africa.
time frames together means that positive and negative ideas
of worth may be forced into uncomfortable juxtaposition.
The values associated with getting what one needs to live well
may be unassailably desirable, and loans may make it possible
to actualize that life in the here and now, but owing amounts
that threaten to increase exponentially as one looks toward
the future can also bring anxiety, opprobrium, and self-blame.
Conducting research on the sensitive topic of indebtedness
as I did between 2007 and 2009 posed particular challenges
given that people were reluctant to discuss personal finances
or engage in conversation about the illegal moneylending that
is pervasive in South Africa. Faced with such circumspection,
I found circumspection to be the best remedy in turn. Stories
about moneylenders, “scams” practiced by repossession
agents, and the like were readily offered, and people were
more willing to give insights into their own and their families’
histories of banking, spending, or saving money than to re-
count the details of their current financial situation. It also
proved necessary to explore a variety of settings, locales, and
types of actors. First, given that the ranks of those who aspire
to join the new middle class far outnumber those included
on the grounds of income and achievement and that they are
to be found in both rural and urban settings, I undertook
interview-based research and participant observation not only
among medium to well-paid employees of the government
but also in a low- to middle-income neighborhood of Soweto
(Gauteng) and in Impalahoek village in Mpumalanga (figs.
1, 2). Second, given the need to move beyond specific locales
and attend to policy issues and the pronouncements of agents
in the state, the corporate sector, and the world of human
rights and NGOs, I also interviewed employees in the banking
sector and registered microlenders and was attentive to those
who seek to regulate or curb their activities, in particular by
talking to debt counselors and sitting in on sessions they held
with their clients, in Pretoria and Midrand (Gauteng; fig. 2).
For the project overall (James 2014), I worked with 73 re-
corded and transcribed interviews as well using field notes
written during participant observation. While some infor-
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mants sought anonymity, others were happy to be cited, and
I have respected their wishes.
The Rise and Regulation of Reckless Lending
In South Africa, circumstances have combined to place bor-
rowers more inexorably in the grip of lenders than they have
in some of the other settings discussed here (Gue´rin 2014;
Villareal 2014). Soon after the transition from apartheid to
democracy brought new promises of prosperity and upward
mobility for those previously dispossessed, rates of borrow-
ing and lending are reported to have increased exponentially
as black consumers took advantage of the credit opportu-
nities they had previously been denied while particular
sectors of the white community started microlending busi-
nesses to cater to and exploit this new market.2 Demon-
strating what was to become its characteristic combination
of neoliberalism and regulatory tendencies, the state—whose
policies during the 1990s had initially enabled such devel-
opments by liberalizing the economy and the provision of
credit in one fell swoop—then sought during the 2000s to
outlaw “reckless lending” and regulate the negative effects
of this borrowing by passing new legislation, the National
Credit Act (NCA) of 2007.
Resulting from these impulses that followed each other in
short order and exhibiting varying degrees of legal formality,
three distinct lending sectors were in evidence by the late
2000s. Each, supplementing or plugging gaps left by the other
two, supplied this new market in its own way. Reflecting the
ethnic and racial divisions of South Africa’s past and of its
new dispensation, each has a linguistic/ethnic specificity (table
1).
1. The mainstream/formal financial sector was historically
dominated by an “oligopoly” of British-owned banks and
rooted in the English-speaking capitalist sector (Verhoef 2009:
157, 181). Later, it was dominated by the “big four” banks—
Absa, First National Bank, Nedbank, and Standard. Alongside
the credit cards, housing loans, and vehicle finance they offer,
this sector also provides retailers’ store cards for clothing and
food, “hire purchase” (installment payments) for furniture
and appliances, and the like. Black people, having had very
restricted access to such loans before the 1990s under credit
apartheid, were offered them in profusion thereafter.
2. The new microlending sector, offering mostly smaller
and short-term loans, grew exponentially in the 1990s and
was mostly run by Afrikaans-speaking former civil servants
who invested their redundancy packages in these businesses.
They did so after leaving state employ when the African
2. I use “black” to denote the members of Bantu language groups,
now often termed “indigenous,” who were at the bottom of the social
ladder under apartheid. I do this in contrast with older South African
practice, which terms them “African” but misleadingly suggests that other
inhabitants of the country are “non-African.”
National Congress became the ruling party. Initially free to
charge “uncapped” interest rates and engaging in practices—
such as the confiscation and use of borrowers’ ATM cards
by way of loan security—that were later prohibited, many
of these subsequently registered as microlenders under the
NCA, which obliged them to charge monthly interest of no
more than 44%. Some of the smaller microlenders consol-
idated to form larger enterprises, notably African Bank and
Capitec, which have now taken their place alongside the
“big four.”
3. Mashonisas, or neighborhood moneylenders,3 came to
be defined by their contrast to their formal microlending
counterpart 2: they were defined as loan sharks because they
remained unregistered under the NCA. (Because borrowers
are often ignorant of the regulations, some use the term,
however, to refer to both registered and unregistered lenders.)
The biggest operators among them use customers’ ATM cards
to withdraw the money owed to them at month end before
returning them to their owners and typically charge monthly
interest of 50%, in excess of the new cap on the interest rate
imposed by the NCA. In this classically financialized manner,
taking advantage of efforts that had been made to bank the
unbanked, some community moneylenders were ensuring re-
payment by using the ATM technique earlier deployed, but
now outlawed for use, by those who were now registered (and
hence considered “formal” and “regulated”).
What of the demand side? Overall, it is black consumers
striving to overcome the imbalances of apartheid whose plight
has underlain the attempted regulation. Analyses showed that
salary- or wage-earning consumers were most likely to be
overindebted. Echoing what happens in many other settings
of stable salaries subjected to less than stable pressures (see
Parry 2012), “these workers earn a regular salary” and there-
fore “qualify for credit, but binding expenditure constraints
possibly places pressure on them to borrow at a level that is
unsustainable” (Daniels 2004:842). Race here is not a defining
feature. Indeed, by 2008 it became clear that white consumers
owed more than black ones.4 But those whose “reckless bor-
rowing” has been of most concern—not surprisingly, because
its members have also had the greatest electoral and political
influence since the advent of democracy—are the black re-
cipients of state salaries (nurses, teachers, policemen) in the
“new” black middle class where public-sector employment
predominates (Crankshaw 2005; Schlemmer 2005; Southall
2004), middle- to low-wage black employees in state-owned
enterprises, and a larger category, subjected to more “pre-
carious” circumstances since democracy (Barchiesi 2011), that
3. The Zulu word mashonisa relates to the verb stems (endings) -shona
(to sink, become poor, die) and -shonisa (to impoverish, cause to become
poor; Dent and Nyembezi 1969:481). It may be translated as “one who
impoverishes” or who “takes and continues to take indefinitely” (Krige
2011:144). In popular parlance the plural is mashonisas (Krige 2011:151;
Siyongwana 2004:851).
4. “The debt abyss lures more SA consumers,” Business Day, February
26, 2008.
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Table 1. Credit supply
Sector Lender Type of loan
1 Mainstream/formal financial sector
(English-speaking capitalists)
Bank loans; store cards for clothing and food; vehicle finance;
furniture and appliances on installments; housing loans
2 New microlending sector
(Afrikaans-speaking former civil servants)
Smaller/short-term loans
3 Informal microlending sector
(neighborhood moneylenders—mashonisas—
in black townships and villages)
Smaller/short-term loans neighborhood moneylenders
has similar aspirations but even fewer means to fulfill them.5
While I have written more fully about the new middle class
elsewhere (James 2014), the principal case study on which
the present paper centers—that of a security guard employed
on a casual basis—hails from the ranks of this increasingly
growing “precariat” (Standing 2011).
If debt involves the obligation to repay the resources bor-
rowed from one’s own future (Peebles 2010:226), the South
African case is distinguished from others in its volume by a
gradual shrinking of the options for temporarily evading such
repayment of debt. The coexistence of multiple registers of
wealth, partly overlapping and/or commensurable but partly
remaining distinct, is a common topic in economic anthro-
pology (Gudeman 2001; Parry and Bloch 1989). Villareal
(2014) shows how Mexican women use “diverse frameworks
of calculation and valuation,” and Gue´rin (2014) speaks of
the “incommensurable, nonsubstitutable financial practices”
that are commonly used to cope with tensions arising from
“the multiple logics of debt.” In South Africa, similar ar-
rangements have certainly been and still are engaged in, al-
ternately to hinder and enable the flow of money, to enable
saving and spending, but the possibilities for “juggling” var-
ious options (Gue´rin 2014; Servet and Saiag 2013) are fewer
than they were. This is so despite the proliferation of new
sources of credit since the end of apartheid. Choosing from
among the three sectors identified above, a consumer is able
to (1) borrow from many banks, use many credit cards, and
hold store cards from an array of retailers as well as have
access to microloans both (2) legal/formal and (3) illegal/
informal (table 1). (Often, as with Gue´rin’s paper, they borrow
from the latter in order to pay back the former). At the same
time, the means by which these debts are collected has shrunk
drastically. Considerable efforts made—with the help of the
United Kingdom’s DfID-funded Finmark Trust—to “bank the
unbanked” (Porteous with Hazelhurst 2004:89) have seen a
deepening financialization of the economy (Ardington et al
2004; Krige 2012). Accompanying this, there are advanced IT
systems rooted in apartheid’s preoccupation with surveillance,
5. Ambiguities that have dogged attempts to characterize, pigeonhole,
and analyze the “black middle class” are too extensive to cover here in
detail; see James (2014) for a longer discussion. For accounts of how the
black middle class consolidated within the public sector in the 1990s, see
Crankshaw (2005, 2008), Southall (2004:533, 2012), and Seekings and
Nattrass (2005:312).
which envision, even if they have not yet achieved, a single
high-tech system to be used for identification, cashing in so-
cial grants, buying, and banking (Breckenridge 2005:272–
273). These technologies, enabling “data to flow from one
contiguous database to another,” have opened up the com-
mercial use of such data (Breckenridge 2005:281).6 What wor-
ries debtors most about these developments is their appli-
cation in transforming what were distinct pockets of finance
into one single flow.
By allowing lenders, formal and informal, to reach into
borrowers’ bank accounts by the means mentioned earlier,
their inclusion in this high-tech banking system leaves such
borrowers, in effect, less place to hide. Sources of credit,
then, have proliferated and become more diverse, but the
technologies of collection have narrowed and become
streamlined.
In the face of these developments, the NCA, although in-
formed by a conviction that lenders should be held to account
(see Graeber 2011; Shipton 2011:232), ended up more often
being used to reform borrowers. The act admittedly achieved
some small successes: curtailing mortgage credit well before,
and hence preventing a South African occurrence of, the sub-
prime crisis, and establishing a system of debt review.7 The
moral/legal framework it established made it possible, as in
the case of Richard Madihlaba discussed below, to persuade
certain creditors to accept some culpability and even to write
off debts. But this was possible only in the relatively rare cases
6. For related points in the case of Ghana, see Breckenridge (2010:
649–650, 655).
7. Debt review was aimed in particular at cases such as those described
below involving amounts of less than R50,000, which were ineligible for
the very expensive process of bankruptcy or sequestration (termed “in-
solvency” in South Africa). According to Boraine and Roestoff, if a debtor
is “insolvent but he or she cannot put up the funds to apply for the
proper relief in terms of the Insolvency Act” or cannot prove “advantage
to creditors, a sequestration order that would eventually lead to a dis-
charge of debt, would be out of reach of such a debtor” (2002:4). Debt
review was intended to give debtors some respite from harassment by
creditors, allowing them to reschedule debts and make payments while
preventing further indebtedness. The counselor identifies the client’s
needs to identify the amount that they need to live, setting aside this
amount before deciding on a realistic set of repayments to be offered to
credit providers. The debtor, once officially under debt review, must be
allowed 60 days’ grace from creditors’ demands before the final schedule
of payments must be agreed and put into practice. For more detail on
the regulation, see James (2013).
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where an independently funded and skilled adviser was willing
to commit much time and effort. In many other cases, debt
counselors’ efforts—alongside those by other state and non-
state actors—were directed toward the end of educating debt-
ors and persuading them to be more frugal. Self-help books
and self-styled financial advisers were aiming at getting con-
sumers to “own” their finances, to partner up in a stable
nuclear family, focus on the future achievements and needs
of one’s own children, and repudiate the claims of kinsmen
and neighbors, advising people, in classically neoliberal style,
to refuse others’ demands (Ndumo 2011:195–196; see also
Stack 2013).8
Overall, lending and borrowing, at rates regarded as “reck-
less,” were continuing apace. When I was writing this in 2013,
6 years after the promulgation of the NCA, the media was
reporting on the notorious case of the shooting of striking
platinum mine workers at Marikana. It turned out that one
important underlying cause of the strike had been the inten-
sified onslaught lenders were making on borrowers’ bank ac-
counts. The miners, not necessarily in the lowest pay bracket,
had unsustainable levels of debt. An additional feature making
this doubly burdensome, indeed intolerable, was the manner
in which their numerous creditors were ensuring repayments.
Miners’ pay, automatically transferred into their bank ac-
counts at month’s end, was being transferred out of these
again with equal ease by those to whom the miners owed
money. These deductions were made in various ways. Lenders
in sectors 1 and 2 (see table 1) used direct debits or “gar-
nishee” or emoluments attachment orders. These are orders
granted by a magistrate or clerk of the court and served on
the employer of a defaulting debtor, enabling a creditor to
take a monthly repayment directly from that debtor’s salary.
Lenders in sector 3 did the equivalent by keeping borrowers’
ATM cards and using these to withdraw funds with interest
from the ATM at month’s end. Shortly after payday, many
of these miners simply had nothing left to live on.9 Despite
regulation, then, the story told here is one of continuing, even
deepening, indebtedness.
8. The philosophy of Gabriel Davel, the regulator at the time, was that
“regulation works best when it persuades players in the industry to accept
responsibility for their own decisions” (Porteous and Hazelhurst 2004:
94). Much effort was expended by state and nonstate actors in imple-
menting systems of financial education and “wellness” in order to per-
suade borrowers to do this.
9. For garnishee abuse, see Haupt and Coetzee (2008), Haupt et al.
(2008), and James (2013); for the Marikana miners, see Lynley Donnelly,
“NCR raises alarm at unsecured lending in Marikana,” Mail and Guard-
ian, October 11, 2012; Chantelle Benjamin, “Ghastly garnishee abuse
exposed,” Mail and Guardian, November 30, 2012; “Editorial: grapple
garnishee ghoul,” Mail and Guardian, November 30, 2012; Keith Breck-
enridge, “Revenge of the commons: the crisis in the South African mining
industry,” History Workshop Online, November 5, 2012 (http://
www.historyworkshop.org.uk/revenge-of-the-commons-the-crisis-in
-the-south-african-mining-industry [accessed December 23, 2013]).
Local Models of Indebtedness
The outline above, by emphasizing the crisis-like character of
borrowing and lending, gives a South African take on a fa-
miliar story.10 But how do borrower informants—including
those newly indebted—experience the situation? A review of
the small and incremental ways they save, invest, and husband
resources or convert by choice between different registers of
value complements the narrow view, through the lens of de-
ferred payment with interest, taken by economists, regulators,
and policy makers (Ardington et al. 2004; Daniels 2004). In-
formants’ models provide a more local, “house”-centered, or
“human” view (Gudeman 2001, 2010; Hart, Laville, and Cat-
tani 2010). They yield a view of mutual obligations between
persons, families, and generations that is akin to “entrust-
ment” (Shipton 2007), in which wealth is held and managed
on behalf of others, and that also aligns with ideas outlined
by Narotzky and Besnier (2014).
In post-1994 South Africa, such ideas articulate “market”
and “community” models (Gudeman 2001), reflecting a long
history of proletarianization and commodification on the one
hand and custom-based social solidarity on the other. Em-
bodying the former, sekoˆloˆtoˆ (from the Afrikaans skuld [debt])
has negative connotations of perpetual enslavement that hark
back to rural cultivators’ experiences of owing money to trad-
ing stores and, more recently, refer to their sense of entrap-
ment in hire-purchase arrangements. Embodying the latter,
lobola captures the idea of long-term obligation and reci-
procity between families (James 2012:22–23; Kuper 1982).11
In classic Maussian style, it includes the payment of bride
wealth from a groom’s to a bride’s family, gifts from the
bride’s to the groom’s family in return, and trousseau-type
items given by parents to a daughter on the occasion of mar-
riage: a model that is tenacious and resilient in the contem-
porary mind (Krige 2012; White 2004). Combined with this,
and with similar tenacity, a further aspect of local social sol-
idarity centers on saving. People club together in stokvels with
relatives or neighbors to husband their resources (Ba¨hre 2007;
Verhoef 2009)—circumscribing these to prevent their every-
day use—often by investing money in particular goods.12 The
two models, rather than remaining discrete, have over the
years been forced into articulation when slender means make
it necessary to “borrow speculative resources . . . from [the]
future” (Peebles 2010:226). The resulting attitude is one of
deep ambivalence: it conjoins the alienation and enslavement
of commodified indebtedness with the close bonds of obli-
gation and reciprocity entailed in “entrustment” (Shipton
2007).
An example illustrates the difficulties arising from the jux-
10. For a U.S. example in similar vein, see Williams (2004).
11. The term lobola, degrammaticized in its transformation into town-
ship slang, is used by speakers of all languages. The correct form in
isiZulu would be ilobolo, in Sepedi (also known as Sesotho sa Leboa),
bohadi.
12. For similar ring-fencing of funds, see Ferguson (1992) on Lesotho.
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taposition of these divergent spheres of value. The story of
Richard Madihlaba—a Sepedi-speaking rurally based migrant
employed as a security guard in Pretoria and whose home is
in GaNchabeleng, Limpopo Province (fig. 1)—exemplifies the
situation of those who qualify for credit by earning a regular
income (if, in his case, a precarious one) and whose aspira-
tions to a decent lifestyle far outstrip their earnings. When I
met him in 2008, he was being given debt counseling by
Mareesa Erasmus of the University of Pretoria Law Clinic. As
I listened, a tale unfolded of almost unimaginable exposure
to consumer credit for one with so few resources. Coming
under pressure from his mother “to pay lobola before she
died” for the mother of his three children, he borrowed “more
than R5,000” from African Bank,13 which he was still paying
off. Because such marriage payments are thought to entail
long-term owing in and of themselves, borrowing money in
order to make them is considered undesirable, but grooms,
faced with demands from in-laws or their own families, will
nonetheless do so when pressed. Further demonstrating his
commitment to long-term conjugal relations and to the local
solidarity economy, Richard and his cohort of home-based
migrant men formed a savings club, Rekgoˆnne (We Can), with
the aim of paying for the substantial costs of a wedding, above
and beyond the lobola itself, for each member in turn. Mem-
bers’ cash contributions are R100 monthly, with a larger
amount of R1,000 payable on the occasion of each member’s
celebration.
These various commitments have both necessitated and are
accumulating on top of others (table 2).14 In his case, as in
many others, it was his conscientious repayment of initial
loans that led to his being offered further credit. After he
repaid his initial loan to Jet, the retailer extended him a sec-
ond, larger loan. But his debts eventually caught up with him.
The final loan, from microlender SA Loans, taken out in order
to repay the other loans, involved “borrowing money from
someone—SA Loans—who charges 360% interest to pay back
someone—RCS—who charges 100%,” so Richard is getting
“much deeper into a hole,” as Mareesa put it.
Richard showed characteristic ambivalence about the effect
of his many loans, and the investments for which they were
intended, on the long-term relationships that lie at their heart.
It was in order to procure the basis of household stability that
he had borrowed money to pay lobola, to further his own
and his children’s education, and to buy clothes and material
goods for the household. He had also sent money home for
building supplies, hoping to start building his own house on
his residential stand in his home village. His actions were the
very essence of frugality and thrift—the opposite of the “prof-
ligate consumer” of which much has been written in the media
(see Krige 2011:294 passim). But broader conditions were
restricting the success of his venture. His wife was spending
the money he remitted on things other than those he had
13. At the time of research, R8 (South African rand) p US$1.
14. For exchange rate, see footnote 13.
envisaged, and she had absented herself, leaving the children
to be cared for by her mother, who he felt was neglecting
them. What he termed his “financial situation” had a bearing
on these conjugal disturbances: “I once brought her my bank
statement, telling her ‘I have a problem. People are debiting
the money from my account. That is why I am not getting
that much money. I have been working in security. And I
have to pay some of the accounts, like Jet, and those accounts
that I have to pay by hand.’ . . . Maybe she [my wife] was
expecting me to be a rich man, buying her expensive clothes.”
While marrying and paying lobola, alongside group-based
savings also oriented toward marriage, were thus crucial to
Richard’s inserting himself securely within the local solidarity
economy, these things required the incurring of so much debt
(sekoˆloˆtoˆ) that they were threatening to undermine that very
security and indeed the house-based arrangements on which
it was supposed to be based. Local views of indebtedness thus
combine two aspects. The positive character of house-cen-
tered aspirations to save and to fulfill long-term social obli-
gations, on the one hand, articulate uneasily with negative
experiences of the financialized arrangements these necessi-
tate, and without which they would prove impossible, and
with being hounded by creditors, taking out further loans,
and being driven “deeper into a hole” on the other.
Credit, Banking, and Moneylending:
The Longer View
Behind the bank accounts and overdrafts Richard Madihlaba
used—and the microloans and array of goods for whose pur-
chase he had got himself into debt—lies a longer history of
constraint. “Credit apartheid,” or the “dual economy of
credit,” are the terms that have been used to characterize the
forms of exclusion suffered by people like him. For the past
half century, black people’s access to credit, tenuous from the
beginning, had become even further restricted. Principal
among the factors underpinning this was a “dual economy”
of land ownership, with opportunities for buying and selling
real estate (and the procuring of mortgages) and chances of
borrowing for business and enterprise, severely restricted or
nonexistent (James 2014; Krige 2011).15 The primary form of
credit that had been available was that offered by furniture
and appliance retailers via the system of hire purchase (Kaplan
1986:168) alongside a smaller element of clothing purchased
on credit by wealthier and more upwardly mobile blacks from
the 1950s onward (Kaplan 1986:270). Practices of borderline
legality that had been habitually used by such retailers in their
dealings with black clients were themselves further evidence
of “credit apartheid.” (Indeed, it was anxiety about these con-
sumer credit practices that had prompted the investigations
that eventually led to the passing of the NCA [DTI 2002,
2004].) As Richard’s story shows, some aspects of this ha-
15. Krige (2011) gives an extensive discussion of the background of
“credit apartheid,” especially in chap. 4.
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Table 2. Richard Madihlaba’s loan portfolio
Sector Lender Amount/purpose
1 Standard Bank account with overdraft facility
African Banka R5,000 for lobola
Jet R6,000 for children’s clothes
Retail Credit Solutions (RCS) R2,800 for family’s DVD player
2 Onecorps R2,800 for own DVD player
SA loans To pay back other loans
a African Bank started as an enterprise in sector 2, grew exponentially, and can now be considered part
of the mainstream.
bituated system were beginning to change. In his credit “port-
folio,” overdrafts, store cards, and microloans predominated
over hire-purchase agreements. This apparent shift in tech-
nology and formal terminology, however, obscures that the
lender was ultimately the same. Large retail firms, both cloth-
ing and furniture based, had started diversifying into the lu-
crative microlending market in the 1990s. Richard had bor-
rowed from one of these, RCS, part of the Foschini clothing
empire, to buy his DVD player (table 2). If the variety of
financial strategies was gradually narrowing down to become
more uniform for the borrower, on the side of the lender,
the divisions between distinct retail products was blurred. A
uniform measure of “debts” to be recouped through bank
accounts was replacing these.
Furniture and Hire Purchase
Investing in items of furniture and appliances, both to em-
bellish houses and as an investment in a fixed asset where
other forms of property were disallowed, was a key aspect of
the black South African experience, especially from the 1950s
onward. Pioneered in urban areas by town dwellers seeking
respectability (Krige 2011:138, 172), the practice readily
spread to rural areas. Where migrants had initially taken a
conservative approach to investment in property and the pur-
chase of material goods, often consolidating the wealth of the
homestead by buying cattle (Ferguson 1992), those migrating
more recently have tended to favor the purchase on credit of
household furnishings. A bride’s parents often provided an
item of furniture as part of her trousseau, later investing in
further items, paying each off in turn, with the eventual aim
of equipping all rooms in the house. Although interest rates
were and remain high (Schreiner et al. 1997), typically more
than doubling the price, many householders have kept up
their repayments in a prudent fashion. Furniture purchase
thus contributed to a ritualized life course as well as involving
aspirations to sophistication and modernity. It exposed house-
holders to gradually increasing expenditure and expanding
credit access over time. Providing a means of “saving” money
by making it unavailable for other things, it could also, how-
ever, when unregulated, lead to unsustainable levels of debt.
The high price and the two-year period of time between
delivery of the goods and the final repayment gave this credit
system its mixture of different styles. There was meticulous
record keeping and mailing out of invoices in brown enve-
lopes to remind purchasers of what they still owed, but trust
was also important: the social and geographical distance be-
tween retailers and their customers in villages made the busi-
ness reliant on intermediaries and lent it a personalized di-
mension. Considerable profits could be made by targeting
low-paid black migrants, but relying on these buyers, with
their low earnings and in some cases reluctance to keep up
repayments, also exposed smaller retailers to financial risk.
The high costs of hire purchase compensated for defaults and
helped pay for repossession operations. Success in making
money in this sector (despite these problems) attracted much
competition (Tlali 1979:26, 30, 116), which made business
owners increasingly determined to increase their profit mar-
gins over those of their rivals while simultaneously reducing
what they paid to employees and agents.
Customers who might have fallen on hard times, when
handed reminders of payment due, often threw them away
or hid them under the bed only to endure the shame of having
items repossessed. The alternative—showing that “trust” was
often honored more in the breach than the observance—was
that some clients entered into collusion with agents or paid
them bribes to depart (Cohen 2004:42–46; Tlali 1979:82–83).
From the customers’ perspective, this was one way to escape
the high interest rates charged. But such efforts did not nec-
essarily make matters easier for customers. One such agent
in a Mpumalanga village, despite having been fired by the
retailer for crooked practice, continued to travel around to
prospective customers taking advantage of villagers’ ignorance
of his dismissal and continuing to pocket the deposits they
were paying in expectation that their furniture would be de-
livered. The errant agent later left the area to go into hiding
in order to escape their wrath once villagers discovered his
trickery (James 2014).
By the early 2000s, despite banks’ efforts to abolish credit
apartheid by extending financial formalization to all sectors
of society, journalist and author David Cohen maintained that
the “traditional business model” of selling furniture on credit
still remained in place to some degree in contrast with the
more familiar worldwide scenario in which “all risk of non-
payment is transferred to the credit card companies” (Cohen
2004:18). The case of Richard Madihlaba suggests, however,
that it was becoming more prevalent to get into hock to
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clothing retailers via store cards and to microlenders (in his
case to buy an electrical appliance) than by buying furniture
from retailers on hire purchase. Many such retailers—such
as members of the JD group—had recently branched out into
financial services and microlending as an equally or more
profitable aspect of the business.16 Lending was becoming
increasingly financialized, and customers’ being banked meant
less risk to creditors than under the traditional business
model.
Money Enclaves
It was the numerous phone calls Richard received from RCS
“to say ‘when are you coming to pay us?’” that drove him to
borrow from the further microlender, SA Loans, “to get
money to pay them” (table 2). The almost universal spread
of mobile phones makes it unnecessary to send out “brown
envelopes” and makes borrowers easier to target by lenders
and advertisers of all sorts. What makes his experience of the
financial sector quintessentially modern, then, is creditors’
ready access to him: either recouping repayment by direct
debit or, in the case of some of the smaller lenders, by tele-
phoning him to remind him of his debts.
This case reveals how the attempted undoing of credit
apartheid involved a concerted effort by various agencies,
including financial institutions themselves, to “bank the un-
banked.” Expanding business so as to include both “those at
the bottom of the pyramid” (Prahalad 2004) and those who,
even if not as poor, had been politically disenfranchised, it
was claimed that access to financial products would benefit
them (Krige 2011:142; Porteous with Hazelhurst 2004:4–6).
Attempting more effectively to reach prospective clients,
South Africa’s banking sector intensified its efforts during the
late 1980s and early 1990s to reach those parts of the market
heretofore reluctant to use its services. While this initially
involved various banks competing with each other in search
of greater profit, the state later intervened, requiring all banks
in the early 2000s to sign the Financial Sector Charter and
to provide a basic savings and transmission account, known
as Mzansi, intended for the poorest, including even those
without a regular income. After market research concluded
that banks seemed to be intimidating and that tellers were
unable to speak any language other than English or Afrikaans,
new branches were set up in urban townships and later in
rural areas. It was done at relatively low cost, in part by
switching all money transfers to ATMs, hiring staff to show
new customers how to use these, and abolishing the uniquely
South African bank charges normally made on every trans-
action (Porteous with Hazelhurst 2004).
My fieldwork showed, however, that those in need of bank-
ing facilities have long been aware of and have made use of
16. David Carte, “JD Group hurt by TV expose´,” Moneyweb,
March 28, 2007, http://www.moneyweb.co.za/moneyweb-carte-blanche
/jd-group-hurt-by-tv-expose.
them, commonly combining the use of formal banks for sav-
ings and transmission purposes with hire-purchase arrange-
ments and informal money borrowing in order to pay for
things in advance. Though credit apartheid was widespread,
it did not necessarily prevent black people from opening bank
accounts. Households were using separate monies and had
complex portfolios and multiple strategies (Collins 2008; see
also Zelizer 1995). Opening an account was commonplace,
especially for men of an older generation who worked on the
mines or in industry. Later, they were joined by a younger
generation of women. Some holders of the new Mzansi ac-
count have simply added this to their existing portfolio of
bank accounts that they had opened several years or even
decades earlier.
But bank accounts were often used for saving in a manner
that hindered rather than enabled an easy flow of money. The
opening and closing of successive accounts often paralleled
other time-specific patterns or reflected spatial disjunctures.
Such discontinuities went hand in hand with the stops and
starts in an uneven history of employment, paralleled the
geographical distances of South Africa’s migrant system, ac-
companied the switch from one spouse to another, or reflected
the domestic distrust that went along with more stable albeit
conflicted relationships. Bank accounts were, in effect, single
rather than multiple use, and it was often for the way they
blocked rather than enabled the ready flow of money that
they were specifically deployed.
Their use was combined with other arrangements, often
intricate and requiring considerable skill and powers of recall
to manipulate and manage. People with commitments to kin
or spouses made their money inaccessible by putting it in
fixed deposits, by arranging with their employers to help them
commit to enforced savings practices (Krige 2011:137; Zelizer
1995), by putting money aside with a retailer in the “lay-by”
(on layaway) system—making a deposit on an item in the
expectation of paying the rest of the price within a set time
period or forfeiting the deposit (Roth 2004:72),17 or indeed
by paying installments for furniture on hire purchase. A ru-
rally based male migrant of an older generation than Richard
Madihlaba, Ace Ubisi, worked in the mines, where at month
end he was given a pay slip to submit to the “time office,”
exchanging it for cash. He deposited some in a building so-
ciety account in order to put it aside, later drawing this out
to buy telegraph orders that he sent home and that his wife
redeemed at the local post office. When he later separated
from his wife and fathered children with a new partner, he
opened up a different account with Standard Bank that he
used to send money back.
Although the experience of urban informants resident in
17. While this and other similar practices by retailers have been decried
for their exploitative character, such criticisms have not taken into con-
sideration the canny manner in which they are often used: householders
have shown a strategic awareness of the advantages to be gained from
economic formality (Krige 2011:137).
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Soweto (fig. 2) is characterized by fewer extremes of geo-
graphical distance, similar discontinuities are nonetheless
evident. Bank accounts were opened when jobs were se-
cured, later becoming dormant when they were lost. The
conflicting demands on the income of men and women and
associated disagreements about household responsibilities
sometimes necessitated the fencing off of wealth stores.
Dinah Zulu’s mother, for example, kept an account separate
from that of her father. He, a truck driver, was the family’s
principal wage earner, with his wages being paid into his
Saambou account, but he was described by Dinah as prone
to drunkenness and as failing to meet his obligations. Fre-
quently unable to gain access to his wages, his wife, like
many women of her age and generation, earned a peripatetic
living beyond the wage sector (Bozzoli and Nkotsoe 1991),
making ready cash by selling cooked food to punters at the
racecourse. Her bank account with Standard served a dual
purpose: it allowed her to deposit her earnings so as to save
part of them, and it enabled her to pay the installments on
the various items of furniture that she bought, successively,
on hire purchase and paid off one by one over the course
of her working life.
While the case of Dinah’s parents reveals how marriage
partners, concerned about each other’s reliability, used bank
accounts to “ring-fence” (isolate) earnings in the 1970s, her
own story illustrates that couples even under less discordant
circumstances—as they do anywhere—kept their finances
separate. Her husband, a policeman, earned a monthly salary
paid into his bank account. Dinah had no formal job but
earned a separate income as an informal tailor. Like many
non-wage-earning women, she used a stokvel/savings club as
a means to save, store, gain intermittent access to, and dis-
tribute money. Under the new dispensation, she acknowl-
edged, “the banks do allow you to have an account—the
Mzansi account is for people who are not working,” but she
told me, “I did once open an Mzansi account, but I don’t
have money to put in it.”18
Migrant laborers and low-paid wage earners were thus us-
ing the banks in ways that reflected a variety of relational,
marital, spatial, and educational discontinuities. Countering
the patchy unevenness of these arrangements, increasing
numbers of employers during the 1990s had started to pay
wages or salaries into bank accounts, with civil servants in
particular being paid via the state payroll system, Persal (Por-
teous and Hazelhurst 2004:77, 81). In the course of the 1990s,
the Department of Social Welfare, in an effort to enable reg-
ularity of payment, similarly encouraged those receiving pen-
sions and social welfare grants to open accounts (Breckenridge
2005; Porteous and Hazelhurst 2004:50–53). Where banking
had previously been used to keep income streams separate
and strategically to avoid certain social obligations while ful-
filling others, it increasingly began to enable the unimpeded
18. Maarten Mittner, “Mzansi accounts flop,” Sake24.com, June 9,
2010.
flow of money—from salary or social grant—into the account
at month end and out of it again. Wages paid directly into
employees’ bank accounts enable employees, in effect, to “bor-
row without collateral” or “use their expected wages as a
collateral substitute” (Roth 2004:78). What were wealth stores
have gradually become wealth conduits, enabling creditors of
all kinds to take what is owed to them using the techniques
and technologies outlined earlier.
Informal Moneylending
The one kind of debt that does not feature in Richard Ma-
dihlaba’s account is that to informal moneylenders. He may
have been too cautious to take out such a loan at the prevailing
interest rate of 50% per month, but it is equally possible that
he had done so but concealed it from his debt counselor. It
is borrowing from mashonisas that evokes some of the am-
biguities of debt most poignantly. The term sekoˆloˆtoˆ (debt)
denotes a labor contract with no end, a form of enslavement.
But borrowers, rather than holding moneylenders responsible
for their misery, often lay the responsibility squarely on their
own shoulders for having been unable to curb their own
consumption. “You are a beggar,” says one, pointing to the
flexible terms and reasonable interest rates when compared,
for example, with that charged by furniture stores for hire
purchase and to the speed with which a loan can be procured.
“You have asked for help so you can’t argue.” However, people
eventually come to resent their own enslavement or denounce
the weakness of relatives for allowing themselves to enter into
such long-term dependencies. The initial self-blame can turn
to anger.
Becoming widespread in the 1980s and particularly from
the mid-1990s onward when credit apartheid was coming to
an end (Siyongwana 2004), this kind of moneylending with
interest acquired financialized techniques, aping those being
used in the new microlending sector (tables 1, 2), which were
to be outlawed at the end of that decade. What have here
become habituated arrangements involve a combination of
willing engagement and resentment by borrowers. Lenders
ask them for their ATM cards as loan security. After with-
drawing the money owed to them on payday, lenders return
these to their owners. Whereas banks and regulated lenders
require a “pay slip” before agreeing to offer credit, informal
lenders do the equivalent after the event by taking the bor-
rower’s card and withdrawing the money owed to them di-
rectly from the bank. Typically, borrowers, shorter of money
than previously, then borrow again, once again voluntarily
yielding up their ATM cards. When borrowers nonetheless
tried to escape by canceling their ATM cards at the bank and
applying for new ones, lenders, aware that it is impossible to
get a new ATM card without an ID (identity) book, retaliated
by asking to keep borrowers’ ID books as well.
My fieldwork in Impalahoek (see fig. 1) revealed a local
account of these developments. Initiated by a white farmer
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in the late 1980s, moneylending in and around the village
began when farm employees started approaching their em-
ployer—not directly but, as paternalistic custom dictates,
via the farm foreman (induna)—to lend them money from
their wages in advance of payday. The induna, advising his
employer to charge interest at the rate of 20% per month—
by then the going rate in township communities—later in-
serted himself as an agent and charged for the service. “At
first they used to pay R20 interest for R100 but when time
went on they paid R50 . . . the other R30 was for the agent.”
The rate of interest thus rose to 50% per month, which is
where it remains for larger moneylenders. The agent/induna
pocketed the difference, using the proceeds to lend money
in his own right, eventually quitting his farm job to become
the preeminent moneylender in the area and using the ATM
technique to secure his loans. The middleman/agent in this
account, initially with little financial muscle of his own, thus
used his wily knowledge of township practice and his in-
termediary status to set up business on his own account.
When such agents became moneylenders, they in turn ac-
quired new agents who themselves set up independently. A
local air force employee, who borrowed from this lender to
pay for a family funeral, took 6 years to pay off the loan of
R10,000, during which time he was “working for” the lender
who kept his ATM card throughout. At the end of this period
he “worked for” the mashonisa in a different capacity, be-
coming an agent who, unknown to his “employer,” colluded
with customers in order to make greater profits for himself.
After this was discovered and he was “dismissed,” he set up
as a mashonisa on his own. The business was so successful
that it enabled him to leave the air force, buy a car, build a
well-appointed house, and send his children to private
schools. “He started as a borrower, now he is a lender,” said
Ace Ubisi, who told me this story. Several lenders were, like
him, in state employ and were effectively “reinvesting” their
state salaries (James 2012).
Informal moneylending has, however, been practiced in
South African rural villages and township areas alike for at
least 50 years. Several accounts of this practice take a sym-
pathetic view of the lender and acknowledge the interdepen-
dence and mutually reinforcing character of borrowing and
lending (Krige 2011; Roth 2004; Siyongwana 2004). While
acknowledging that structural factors limit householders’ op-
tions to borrow from the formal sector at reasonable rates,
thus driving them toward illegal moneylenders instead, these
accounts also show that such loans may be cheaper than those
available from the formal sector, especially given that the ad-
ministrative costs and the risks of nonrepayment are consid-
erable (Roth 2004:52). Small-scale and neighborhood lenders’
connections to borrowers also serve to cap the interest rate.
Given that loans are intended to be repaid at month end, no
escalation will be calculated even in the case of default: doing
so would make repayment increasingly difficult, give the
lender a reputation for unfairness, and increase the chances
that violence be used against him and prompt complaints to
the authorities. Community mindedness thus converges
neatly with careful calculation in these lending arrangements
(Krige 2011:154–158). The local mashonisa has an embed-
dedness in community arrangements that, alongside her de-
sire to stay in business, controls the terms under which re-
payment is sought.
While moneylending of this kind has long been pervasive
in urban townships and small-town settings in the former
homelands (James 2012; Krige 2011:136–181; Roth 2004), and
while borrowers and lenders cannot be easily separated be-
cause people may do both at once ( Gue´rin 2014; James 2012;
Servet and Saiag 2013), the rise of the more professional and
big-time moneylenders has given pause to analysts and econ-
omists. In 2004 it was estimated that 30,000 such lenders were
active and that black lenders were borrowing more from them,
at injurious rates, than they were from formal institutions
(Ardington et al. 2004:619).
Conclusion
Under South Africa’s new democracy, stringent efforts were
and are being made to incorporate those previously politically
disenfranchised and to create a single economic framework
from a dual one. In such a setting, debt has complex meanings.
For those better off and more aspirational than Richard Ma-
dihlaba, among them the new swathe of civil servants and
state employees who constitute South Africa’s “new middle
class” (Southall 2004), the obligation to invest in social and
conjugal relations brought with it proportional expenditure
as well as further commitments entailed in novel visions of
value. Expectations and hopes, of higher education for chil-
dren, and of support for less well-off relatives (Stauffer 2010),
have increased, exponentially and out of proportion to the
incomes that are supposed to underpin them. If responding
to these aspirations entailed borrowing “speculative re-
sources” from “the future,” this need not necessarily, however,
be seen as leading to unsustainable crisis. After all, it was
credit—the “good” meaning of debt (Peebles 2010:226)—
that, at least in part, enabled the very growth of this new
middle class. The positive social consequences, at least in some
cases, were outweighing or at least counterbalancing the neg-
ative ones.19
Even for borrowers like Richard, indebtedness was the re-
sult of prudence rather than either impoverishment or prof-
ligacy, and it was leveraged as a strategy for individual self-
actualization in a setting of extensive communal obligations
rather than irrational consumption. But the negative conse-
quences of the debts that took him to the counselor seemed
to be outweighing whatever social worth they might have been
taken out to achieve. Indebtedness, here, had a potential to
19. I am grateful to Detlev Krige for encouraging me to pursue this
line of investigation.
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produce new forms of oppression and disenfranchisement in
place of the older ones it had replaced.
The onset of borrowing possibilities that were unleashed
by South Africa’s credit/debt revolution produced a peculiarly
mediated kind of capitalism. Many of those who lend money
borrow it as well; conversely, borrowers are also lenders. This
paper has shown some of the underpinnings and contradic-
tory aspects of the situation, illustrating how difficult it is to
separate bad from good protagonists or perpetrators from
victims. The broader backdrop is one in which the sometimes
contradictory forces of state and market have intertwined to
create a redistributive neoliberalism in which people at all
levels attempt to make “money from nothing” (James 2014).
As the banks did with the poor housing purchasers in the
subprime mortgage market in the United States, so a far wider
spectrum of lenders does to a wider spectrum of borrowers
in this setting: gaining access to the money—however small
the amount—of the widest possible range of people is essential
to generating profit in a system based more on consumption
and rent seeking than production.
But the fact that so many intermediaries have a stake in
the existing system does not simply mean business as usual.
Banking with and borrowing from banks, buying appliances
on the “never-never” (long-term credit), and asking neigh-
borhood lenders for loans are present-day practices set against
the longer-term arrangements that were institutionalized by
credit apartheid, arrangements that have left an indelible
stamp on their later versions. Householders, intermediaries,
repossession agents, and moneylenders all play roles premised
on these older models. In its earlier incarnation, this peculiarly
South African version of finance, while formally excluding
people, simultaneously left open a variety of possibilities. Bor-
rowers might “juggle” various options, using enforced meth-
ods of saving such as stokvels or hire purchase to escape ob-
ligations in one register while fulfilling those in another. Many
of these options were mediated through the highly person-
alized relationships that were struck up between clients on
the one hand and repossession agents, fly-by-night “scam-
mers,” or informal moneylenders’ apprentices on the other.
All were ready to collude with customers against the big op-
erators, banks, and companies that were gradually extending
greater access—but always on prejudicial terms.
Although produced within the severe constraints of credit
apartheid, these forms of collusion, alongside the community
embeddedness of credit relationships, had earlier given debt-
ors some flexibility about repayment and even allowed some
temporarily to escape their obligations. In credit postapart-
heid, increasingly financialized technologies, albeit combined
with informalized relationships, have begun enabling creditors
to pursue debtors with greater ease than previously. Credit
postapartheid, while retaining some features associated with
its forerunner, credit apartheid, has a more uniform and
streamlined character. Getting “deeper into a hole” may rep-
resent things from this negative perspective alone and thus
show only one side of the picture. But it does encompass an
important aspect of the deeply ambivalent feelings about en-
trapment that black South Africans, or certain among their
number, experience in the face of debt.
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